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THE BIG STINK ABOUT GARBAGE:  
STATE v. MCMURRAY AND A REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
BRITTANY CAMPBELL* 
Abstract: On March 11, 2015, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed a 
lower court decision against David Ford McMurray, who was found guilty of 
third-degree possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to twenty-
four months. McMurray was charged after Hutchinson, Minnesota police 
searched through his garbage and found evidence of methamphetamine. The 
majority held that a warrantless search of the defendant’s garbage was reason-
able under the federal and state constitutions because a person has no reason-
able expectation of privacy in garbage set out for collection on the side of a 
public street because garbage is readily accessible to other members of the 
public. The dissenting judge persuasively opined that there is, in fact, a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy when an individual places his or her garbage at 
the curb for collection because household waste contains personal information 
that most individuals expect will remain private. This Comment argues that 
the dissent’s approach better understands the private nature of waste, the opin-
ion’s troubling repercussions for disadvantaged communities, and the poten-
tial for broader government intrusion. 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 2, 2012, David Ford McMurray placed his garbage at the 
curb for collection outside of his Hutchinson, Minnesota home, unaware 
that this routine act would eventually lead to his conviction and two-year 
sentence.1 Acting on a tip, but without obtaining a warrant, the Hutchinson 
police searched through McMurray’s garbage and found evidence of meth-
amphetamine.2 This warrantless search then led the police to obtain a war-
rant and search McMurray’s home, where they found more illegal narcot-
ics.3 Given these findings, McMurray was ultimately charged with third-
degree possession of a controlled substance.4 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2015–2016. 
 1 See State v. McMurray (McMurray II), 860 N.W. 2d 686, 688 (Minn. 2015). 
 2 See id. 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. During their search of the house Hutchinson police found “plastic bags containing a 
‘crystal like substance,’” one of which tested positive for 3.3 grams of methamphetamine. See id. 
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At a bench trial, McMurray moved to suppress the evidence seized 
from his home, arguing that the warrant authorizing the search of his home 
was predicated upon an unconstitutional search of his garbage.5 The district 
court denied McMurray’s motion and found him guilty of possession of a 
controlled substance, imposing a two-year prison sentence.6 McMurray ap-
pealed his conviction, arguing primarily that, because the warrantless search 
through his trash was unconstitutional, it did not yield the probable cause 
required to authorize the search of his home, but the Court of Appeals of 
Minnesota disagreed with him and affirmed the district court.7 
Following another appeal by McMurray, the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota also affirmed the decisions below.8 The principle issue presented was 
whether a citizen has a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out 
for collection on the side of a public street.9 The court held that a warrant-
less search of the defendant’s garbage was reasonable under the federal and 
state constitutions because a person has no reasonable expectation of priva-
cy in this situation because garbage is “readily accessible to scavengers and 
other members of the public.”10 In his dissenting opinion, Justice David 
Lillehaug disagreed with the majority and opined that, given the intimate 
nature of today’s garbage, Minnesotans do “have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy when they put their household waste in opaque bags and do what 
the government requires . . . .”11 The dissenting judge emphasized that Min-
                                                                                                                           
 5 State v. McMurray (McMurray I), No. A12–2266, 2013 WL 5021206, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. 
March 11, 2015), aff’d, 860 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 2015). 
 6 See id. The court imposed the “mandatory minimum sentence for a person previously con-
victed of a felony controlled substance crime.” McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 688–89. 
 7 See McMurray I, 2013 WL 5021206 at *1. 
 8 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 695. 
 9 See id. 687, 694–95. McMurray also “concede[d] that the Fourth Amendment does not pro-
hibit warrantless searches of garbage set out for collection,” but asked the court to interpret Article 
I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, which is nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution, to provide more protection than the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 689. The 
court relied on Kahn v. Griffin, which sets forth the circumstances under which the Minnesota 
Constitution may provide greater protection than the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 690; see Kahn v. 
Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828–29 (Minn. 2005). The court held that, pursuant to Kahn, the federal 
precedent “was not a sharp or radical departure from U.S. Supreme Court precedent, did not re-
trench on a Bill of Rights issue, and does not fail to adequately protect a unique, distinct, or pecu-
liar issue of state and local concern.” McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 693; see Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 
828–29. Therefore, there was no principled basis for interpreting the Minnesota Constitution as 
more protective than the U.S. Constitution here. See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 693. 
 10 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 695; see, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–
41 (1988) (holding that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage 
left at the curb); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982) (“defendant had no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of the plastic bags placed in or near his 
open garbage can and . . . the examination of the garbage, which was procured without trespassing 
on the defendant’s premises, was lawful”). 
 11 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 695, 697 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
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nesotans’ basic rights and liberties are vulnerable if the government can take 
garbage and search through it without a warrant.12 
Part I of this Comment outlines the factual and procedural history of 
McMurray. Part II discusses the linear opinion of the majority of the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota and the dissent’s reasoning as to why there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy when placing one’s garbage out for col-
lection. Part III advocates for the dissent’s perspective that the private na-
ture of household waste should lead to a reasonable expectation of privacy 
over it, and that privacy is not abandoned at the curb. Further, the analysis 
argues that the majority’s sweeping opinion entirely ignores the realities of 
disadvantaged communities and lays the foundation for the government to 
increasingly examine its citizens’ most private information. 
I. MCMURRAY’S FIGHT TO THE MINNESOTA HIGH COURT 
In January 2012, the Hutchinson police received a tip regarding David 
Ford McMurray’s potentially illegal activity when a mandated reporter in-
formed the department that McMurray’s daughter saw her mother with what 
she believed was a pipe used for consuming drugs.13 In response, an inves-
tigator with the Hutchinson Police Department, Officer Andrew Erlandson, 
reviewed police records and discovered that McMurray and his wife had 
been formerly arrested for controlled substance violations.14 
With this information, the officer arranged for the waste management 
company that collected McMurray’s garbage to veer from its normal routine 
of compacting the garbage with neighbors’ bags and taking it to a landfill 
and instead to deliver McMurray’s garbage directly to Officer Erlandson.15 
On February 2, 2012, after McMurray placed his garbage containers at the 
curb for pick-up, the driver did as instructed, and Officer Erlandson subse-
quently took the garbage to the police station for inspection.16 During his 
search, he discovered “drug paraphernalia,” “documents belonging to 
McMurray and his wife,” and “several plastic bags containing white resi-
due, which later tested positive as methamphetamine.”17 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See id. at 697. 
 13 State v. McMurray (McMurray II), 860 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn. 2015). A mandated re-
porter is someone who has “an ongoing responsibility for the health, education, or welfare of a 
child,” and is required to report known or reasonably suspected child abuse and neglect. MINN. 
STAT. § 626.556; 17A Minn. Prac., Minnesota Employment Laws § 13.871 (2015 ed.). In Minne-
sota, mandated reporters include health practitioners, social workers, clergy members, law en-
forcement, teachers, and correctional supervisors. MINN. STAT. § 626.556. 
 14 McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 688; see State v. McMurray (McMurray I), No. A12–2266, 
2013 WL 5021206, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. March 11, 2015), aff’d, 860 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 2015). 
 15 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 695–96 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
 16 See id. at 696. 
 17 See id. at 688 (majority opinion). 
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The next day, Officer Erlandson used the tip from the mandated re-
porter and the evidence of illegal narcotics found in McMurray’s garbage to 
secure a warrant to conduct a search of McMurray’s home.18 Hutchinson 
police ultimately found 3.3 grams of methamphetamine and additional drug 
paraphernalia inside the home.19 Pursuant to Minnesota statute, the state 
then charged McMurray with third-degree possession of a controlled sub-
stance.20 
McMurray filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was taken from 
his home, arguing that the police violated Article I, Section 10 of the Min-
nesota Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, 
when they searched his garbage without a warrant.21 He claimed that, with-
out the warrantless evidence found in his garbage, there was no probable 
cause to authorize the warrant to search his home, thus, the search of his 
home was unconstitutional.22 The district court denied McMurray’s motion, 
reasoning that Minnesota precedent establishes that warrantless searches of 
garbage are reasonable because individuals do not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in their garbage.23 
After the district court convicted McMurray and imposed a statutorily 
required two-year prison sentence, McMurray appealed his conviction to 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress.24 The Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court’s denial of McMurray’s motion, holding that there is no expectation of 
privacy in garbage placed at the curb for collection.25 Further, according to 
the court, it is well-settled in Minnesota that garbage left out for collection 
at the curb is “not within the curtilage of the home,” thus, it is not protected 
by the warrant requirement of the Minnesota Constitution.26 
McMurray then appealed the Court of Appeals decision, and the Min-
nesota Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Minnesota 
Constitution affords its citizens a reasonable expectation of privacy “in the 
contents of bags containing household waste placed in a closed container 
set out at the curb for lawful collection.”27 Affirming the decisions below, 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See id. 
 19 See McMurray I, 2013 WL 5021206 at *1. 
 20 McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 688; see MINN. STAT. § 152.023. 
 21 See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10; McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 688. 
 22 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 688. 
 23 See id.; State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982) (“defendant had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of the plastic bags placed in or near his open 
garbage can and . . . the examination of the garbage, which was procured without trespassing on 
the defendant’s premises, was lawful”). 
 24 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 688, 689. 
 25 See McMurray I, 2013 WL 5021206 at *1, *2, *3. 
 26 Id. at *2–*3 (citing State v. Goebel, 654 N.W.2d 700, 701). 
 27 McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 696 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
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the Supreme Court determined that a person in McMurray’s situation has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy because such garbage “is readily accessi-
ble to scavengers and other members of the public.”28 Thus, because a law 
enforcement officer could have taken McMurray’s household waste directly 
from the curb, it was lawful for Hutchinson police to retrieve McMurray’s 
garbage from the waste collector and search it without a warrant.29 Because 
the search of McMurray’s garbage was reasonable, the search warrant for 
his home was valid.30 
II. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION ON GARBAGE PRIVACY 
A majority of the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed the decisions 
of the lower courts that the warrantless search of McMurray’s garbage was 
reasonable under federal and state constitutions.31 In its two-step analysis, 
the court first determined that the Minnesota Constitution does not require 
greater protection of privacy for garbage searches beyond that offered by 
the U.S. Constitution.32 The court then reviewed the search of McMurray’s 
garbage pursuant to these federal and state constitutions.33 Ultimately, it 
held that a Minnesotan has no reasonable expectation of privacy in house-
hold waste set out for collection because any member of the public could 
access it.34 
In his dissent, Judge David L. Lillehaug argued that the majority failed 
to recognize that the basic right and liberty against unreasonable search and 
seizure of household waste necessitates heightened protection because 
waste includes information about one’s most private traits and activities.35 
Specifically, the dissent attacked the majority’s contention that, because 
people and animals have access to other citizens’ waste, it carries no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.36 Judge Lillehaug suggested that this opin-
ion will further grant the government permission to become more intrusive 
in our trash and in our lives.37 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See id. at 695 (majority opinion). 
 29 See id. 
 30 See id. 
 31 McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 695. 
 32 Id. at 693. 
 33 See id. at 694. 
 34 Id. at 695. 
 35 See id. at 697 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
 36 See id. at 699. 
 37 See id. at 702. 
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A. The Majority’s Rejection of Privacy Beyond the Curb 
Judge Wright, writing for the majority, first considered McMurray’s 
claim that, despite its nearly identical language, the Minnesota Constitution 
provides greater protection than the U.S. Constitution with respect to one’s 
right against unreasonable searches and seizures of garbage left at the 
curb.38 The U.S. Supreme Court in California v. Greenwood held that the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit “the warrantless search and seizure of 
garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a home.”39 However, 
McMurray asked for heightened protection under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion, arguing that the reasoning in Greenwood is unpersuasive.40 
The court considered the three factors laid out in Kahn v. Griffin for 
determining whether there is a principled basis to interpret the Minnesota 
Constitution to require greater protection than the U.S. Constitution.41 The 
court ultimately decided that the individual liberty issue at hand does not 
successfully navigate one of the three avenues to amount to a principled 
basis, and thus, requires no further protection.42 First, the court held that 
Greenwood did not mark a “sharp or radical departure” from U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent or from the decisions of other state courts, including the 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision in State v. Oquist that had previously 
considered the issue of privacy related to garbage.43 Second, the court held 
                                                                                                                           
 38 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); MINN. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10 (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the person or things to be seized.”); see McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 695 (majority 
opinion). 
 39 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988). 
 40 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 689. McMurray relied on the Greenwood dissent and 
other state court decisions to support this assertion. Id. 
 41 Id. at 693; see Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828–29 (Minn. 2005). 
 42 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 693. When the U.S. Constitution has substantially similar 
language to the text of a state constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court has previously interpreted 
that language, the court will only afford greater protection for individual rights under the Minne-
sota Constitution when there is a “principled basis to do so.” See id. at 690. The court will recog-
nize a principled basis when: (1) the U.S. Supreme Court “has made a sharp or radical departure 
from its previous decisions or approach to the law and when [it] discern[s] no persuasive reason to 
follow such a departure”; (2) when the “Supreme Court has retrenched on Bill of Rights issues”; 
or (3) when the “federal precedent does not adequately protect our citizens’ basic rights and liber-
ties.” Kahn 701 N.W.2d at 828. 
 43 McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 691 (quoting Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828); see State v. Oquist, 
327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982) (“defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to the contents of the plastic bags placed in or near his open garbage can and . . . the exam-
20 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
that Greenwood did not retrench on the Bill of Rights issue at hand, protec-
tion against warrantless searches, because Greenwood is consistent with 
many other state court decisions and because McMurray had not recognized 
an authority or commentator characterizing Greenwood as a “retrench-
ment.”44 Lastly, the court held that Greenwood does not fail to protect a 
Minnesotan’s basic right or liberty because the privacy surrounding garbage 
at the curb is not a “‘unique, distinct or peculiar issue[ ] of state and local 
concern’ that requires protection.”45 
Upon concluding that there is no principled basis for affording greater 
protection for individual rights under the Minnesota Constitution in this 
context, the court next examined whether the search of McMurray’s gar-
bage was reasonable under Greenwood and Oquist, the federal and state 
authorities that interpreted this constitutional question.46 Under both deci-
sions, one “has no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out for 
collection on the side of a public street because such garbage is readily ac-
cessible to scavengers and other members of the public.”47 A warrant is not 
required for police to search items that are readily accessible to the general 
public; thus, the majority held that it was lawful for police to collect 
McMurray’s garbage from the waste management company and search it.48 
Because the warrantless search of McMurray’s garbage was reasonable un-
der the U.S. Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution, the subsequent 
search of McMurray’s home was also valid and the drugs found there were 
properly admitted into evidence.49 
B. The Dissent Prioritizes Privacy and Warns for the Future 
In his dissent, Judge Lillehaug disagreed with the majority’s decisions 
that Minnesotans have no expectation of privacy in their garbage set out for 
collection, that law enforcement may search and seize household waste 
without a warrant, and that “household privacy ends at the sidewalks.”50 In 
his view, McMurray’s case implicates a principled basis for the court to 
construe that the Minnesota Constitution requires more protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures than the U.S. Constitution, just as many 
                                                                                                                           
ination of the garbage, which was procured without trespassing on the defendant’s premises, was 
lawful”). 
 44 McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 692; Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 828. 
 45 McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 692–93 (quoting Kahn, 701 N.W.2d at 829). 
 46 See id. at 694. 
 47 Id. at 695; see Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40–41; State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 
(Minn. 1982). 
 48 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 695. 
 49 See id. 
 50 See id. at 695, 701 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
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Minnesota courts have done before.51 Specifically, Judge Lillehaug con-
tended that Greenwood, the federal precedent for warrantless searches of 
garbage, does not sufficiently safeguard Minnesota citizens’ basic rights and 
liberties.52 Judge Lillehaug argued that these basic rights and liberties are at 
risk if the government can collect and search curbside garbage, an increas-
ingly private window into a Minnesotan’s life, without a search warrant.53 
He warned that the eventual ramifications of the majority’s holding are also 
of grave concern.54 
Judge Lillehaug argued that household waste necessitates greater pro-
tection because it often includes Minnesotans’ most personal information 
and intimate tangibles.55 He focused on the notion that humans manifest 
themselves in nearly everything they toss into the trash, including prescrip-
tions, printed emails, photographs, hygiene products, human DNA, the lit-
erature they read, and the food they consume. 56  According to Judge 
Lillehaug, what they do not throw away is the expectation and desire that 
this information will remain private.57 Until one’s household waste has “lost 
its identity and meaning by becoming part of a large conglomeration of 
trash elsewhere,” that person has every reason to not want his or her “tell-
tale refuse and trash to be examined by neighbors or others.”58 
Moreover, the dissent argued that the Greenwood and Oquist decisions 
from the 1980s no longer account for the transitioning character of house-
hold waste, which now consists of discarded technology and digital devices 
such as old computers, cellular devices, routers, flash drives, servers and 
disks—all of which may contain, reveal, and “hold for many Americans 
‘the privacies of life.’”59 Judge Lillehaug warned that this trend will only 
progress as the objects in our world continue to transform into electronic 
devices.60 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See id. at 696; see, e.g., State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 363 (Minn. 2004) (holding 
that the Minnesota Constitution demands greater protection than the Fourth Amendment by requir-
ing a reasonableness limitation for searches and seizures even during minor traffic stops); In re 
Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565, 578 (Minn. 2003) (recognizing a legitimate expectation of 
privacy under Minnesota Constitution for short–term social guests even if not recognized under 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 52 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 697 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting). 
 53 Id. at 697, 701. 
 54 See id. at 702. 
 55 See id. at 697; State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 802 (N.J. 1990) (“Clues to people’s most 
private traits and affairs can be found in their garbage.”). 
 56 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 697, 698. 
 57 See id. at 697. 
 58 Id. (quoting People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1268 (Cal. 1971)). 
 59 See id. at 697–98 (quoting Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014)). “This is 
not your grandfather’s garbage.” Id. at 697. 
 60 See id. at 698. 
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The dissent further recognized that there is a “long-standing presump-
tion that a search warrant is required to search a Minnesotan’s container.”61 
Accordingly, a Minnesotan’s basic right and liberty against unreasonable 
search and seizure is not adequately protected if Greenwood is controlling 
and any expectation of privacy ends at the curb.62 
Judge Lillehaug attacked the majority’s reasoning that, because gar-
bage bags left on the side of the curb are readily accessible to scavengers 
and members of the public, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy.63 
The dissent asserted that the animals and persons that sometimes success-
fully get into household waste containers should not determine a Minneso-
tan’s reasonable expectation of privacy.64 In Minnesota, the lone fact that a 
garbage container itself is in “plain view provides no basis for a warrantless 
seizure and search of it, even assuming probable cause as to the contents.”65 
Even the government acknowledges that tenants and homeowners have a 
reasonable expectation that their garbage will be directly collected.66 Judge 
Lillehaug argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s garbage 
is further supported by local ordinances regulating garbage disposal.67 
Lastly, Judge Lillehaug claimed that the ultimate consequences of the 
majority’s decision are vexing and extend far beyond the text of the opin-
ion.68 Given this holding, nothing would stop the government from confis-
cating the household waste from every Minnesotan and performing a foren-
sic analysis of it.69 It also would not be unconstitutional for the government 
to seize the digital devices Minnesotans recycle and copy their data.70 The 
dissent reasoned that, in this day and age in which the government can col-
lect almost all calls and emails, it would not be unrealistic for the govern-
ment to use this ruling to its utmost advantage and push the boundaries of 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. 
 62 See id. (citing Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40). 
 63 See id. at 699. 
 64 See id. 
 65 Id. at 698 (quoting Matter of Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 694 (Minn. 1997)). 
 66 See id. at 699. 
 67 See id. at 699–700 (citing State v. Crane, 329 P.3d 689, 696–97 (N.M. 2014)). Many Min-
nesota localities prohibit “scavenging of recyclable materials” or “upsetting the contents of any 
waste container.” Id. at 699; see, e.g., DULUTH, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 24–3(a) (2014); ST. PAUL, 
MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 357.11 (2014). Additionally, a Minneapolis ordinance prohibits 
any unauthorized person from removing waste from containers set out for collection without con-
sent of the owner or occupant of the property. MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES 
§ 225.590 (2014). Judge Lillehaug believes that the very fact that these ordinances exist and that 
Minnesotans must comply with them bolsters one’s expectation that household waste will also 
remain private from government intrusion. See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 700 (citing Crane, 
329 P.3d at 696–97). 
 68 See McMurray II, 860 N.W.2d at 702. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
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invasion of privacy.71 Judge Lillehaug criticized the majority for failing to 
clarify that the “government does not have a green light to broaden and 
deepen its efforts to acquire our most intimate information.”72 
III. THE MAJORITY’S TROUBLING OPINION AND WHY A REASONABLE 
EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HOUSEHOLD WASTE SHOULD EXIST 
The majority’s opinion presents many reasons for the citizens of Min-
nesota to be gravely concerned.73 The decision largely, and incorrectly, re-
lied upon Greenwood and Oquist, two decisions that interpret the federal 
constitution with respect to unreasonable searches and seizures of house-
hold waste.74 Not only is the majority’s decision procedurally unsound, it is 
also substantively troubling.75  It fails to adequately consider the factors 
weighed in determining whether there is a principled basis for interpreting 
the Minnesota Constitution to provide greater protection than the U.S. Con-
stitution, particularly the vital policy considerations.76 
Until McMurray, a Minnesota court had never decided whether an in-
dividual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in this context under the 
Minnesota Constitution.77 In the 1980s, the U.S. Supreme Court in Green-
wood and the Minnesota Supreme Court in Oquist independently held that 
the Fourth Amendment does not provide a citizen with a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in garbage left in a public space outside of a residence.78 
Both courts interpreted the U.S. Constitution, and once again, the Fourth 
Amendment was the basis for interpretation in McMurray, but this time in-
appropriately.79 The majority improperly utilized the federal court’s inter-
pretation of the U.S. Constitution as the sole basis for a state court’s inter-
pretation of its state constitution, which turns federalism on its head.80 
                                                                                                                           
 71 See id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. at 702; Appellant’s Brief at 26, State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 2015) 
(No. A12–2266) [hereinafter Appellant’s Brief]. 
 74 See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 73, at 6–7; Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5, State v. McMur-
ray, 860 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 2015) (No. A12–2266) [hereinafter Appellant’s Reply Brief] (citing 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 
1982)). 
 75 See Appellant’s Brief, supra note 73, at 6–7. 
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When similarly-constructed rights are at stake, a state supreme court can 
use a U.S. Supreme Court decision to interpret its own state constitution, 
but it is not required to.81McMurray raised no Fourth Amendment claim, 
and accordingly, the court should not have given such great deference to a 
federal interpretation of the issue at hand.82 
Ultimately, the majority did not sufficiently consider whether the basic 
right and liberty against unreasonable search and seizure is sufficiently pro-
tected in Minnesota.83 Instead, it overly focused on whether Greenwood 
marked a sharp or radical departure from U.S. Supreme Court precedent or 
from the decisions of other state courts.84 In response to the dissent’s policy 
considerations, the court merely mentioned briefly that “Minnesotans are 
well aware of potential threats to their privacy and security” and are able to 
adjust their behavior in response.85 Had the court considered more policy 
considerations instead of narrowing its focus to the sharp-departure stand-
ard, it would have served principles of federalism and realized that this case 
falls under the third Kahn factor for providing greater protection than the 
U.S. Constitution because the federal precedent does not “adequately pro-
tect[] Minnesotans’ basic rights and liberties.”86 
What is most troubling about the McMurray holding is that it neglects 
the opinion’s potential effect on disadvantaged communities.87 The majority 
argues that Minnesotans recognize the threat posed to their privacy and se-
curity and are capable of changing their behavior as needed.88 That assump-
tion is far too expansive, and it cannot be said that disadvantaged communi-
ties, such as the elderly or uneducated, are aware of these dangers or even 
have the means to adjust their behavior.89 It is unlikely that someone living 
in low-income housing has the finances to afford “shredders and trash com-
pactors and computer ‘burn’ programs and sink grinders and attics and burn 
boxes and private landfills that would be necessary” to manually, and with 
finality, dispose of both their garbage and any possibility for intrusion into 
it.90 Additionally, in an age where the government often requires citizens to 
segregate and recycle personal electronics, it would be inconceivable to 
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suggest as an alternative that elderly and low-income individuals travel di-
rectly to a recycling center to dispose of these items.91 
The sanctity and privacy of personal items that may be located in 
household waste is the ultimate reason for adequately protecting the basic 
right and liberty against unreasonable search and seizure of garbage placed 
on a curb for routine collection.92 As the dissent suggests, it is the very pri-
vate nature of garbage that grants one a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
that garbage.93 Household waste today reflects nearly every human activi-
ty. 94  Objects and information commonly found in garbage include 
“[b]usiness records, bills, correspondence, magazines, tax records, and oth-
er telltale refuse [that] can reveal much about a person’s activities, associa-
tions, and beliefs.”95 Leaving this information at the curb for a garbage col-
lector does not abandon one’s reasonable expectation of privacy in that gar-
bage any more than relinquishing other items to other types of carrier ser-
vices, such as leaving a package out for pickup by the U.S. Postal Service.96 
Surely citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy in their homes are 
greater than that in their household waste, but it does not follow that a lesser 
expectation of privacy renders any reasonable expectation of privacy non-
existent.97 For example, the expectation of privacy in one’s car is less than 
one’s home, but a reasonable expectation of privacy in that car still exists.98 
Accordingly, a warrant predicated upon probable cause is still required for 
police to search a car.99 A lesser expectation of privacy in garbage also does 
not defeat the probable-cause requirement.100 Moreover, as the dissent right-
ly indicated, the possibility of others scavenging through one’s trash does 
not defeat the reasonable expectation of privacy in it.101 
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Most people do not regularly fear someone digging through their gar-
bage.102 This is not to say, however, one would not be shocked and dis-
turbed upon learning that a neighborhood snoop reconstructed and pub-
lished a detailed, intimate biography of this person’s life.103 Tort law and 
copyright law could provide this person with remedies for respective harms 
from this violation.104 Clearly, there are legally protected interests in house-
hold waste even once it is left at the curb, interests that the Minnesota Con-
stitution should protect.105 
CONCLUSION 
Privacy. It’s one of our most cherished inalienable rights. One of our 
most basic rights and liberties, yet seemingly one of our most fragile rights. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota tainted this right when it held that a Min-
nesota citizen has no reasonable expectation of privacy in household waste 
set out for routine collection simply because any scavenger or member of 
the public can access such waste. 
The consequences of tossing this expectation of privacy in the trash are 
unnerving and abundant. Until one’s garbage has lost its identity by becom-
ing part of an indecipherable pile, there are many reasons why residents 
would not expect their curbside trash to be examined by others, particularly 
law enforcement officers without a valid warrant to do so. The dissent cor-
rectly recognized that household waste includes a halo of privacy above it 
because it often contains one’s most intimate information, particularly given 
technological advances within the past thirty years. Above all, the majori-
ty’s decision entirely ignores disadvantaged individuals who cannot other-
wise protect themselves, and dangerously permits overreaching government 
intrusion into Minnesotans’ lives. Additionally, the McMurray opinion cre-
ates the potential for further abuse of more than just disadvantaged commu-
nities, with ramifications beyond drug convictions. It could lead the gov-
ernment to continue pushing the boundaries of what areas of life many citi-
zens deem as private are now acceptable to snoop in. 
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